CalFed Bancorp is one of 126 S&Ls now suing the U.S. government for breach of contract related to supervisory goodwill, a form of goodwill created in the acquisition of insolvent thrifts during the early 1980s. Before a determination of damages in its lawsuit, CalFed announced and issued the first of two litigation participation securities giving shareholders a claim on recovered damages, if any. The most likely explanation for why this announcement generated a positive excess return is that it signaled an increased probability of takeover. The security also reveals important, yet previously unavailable, information about CalFed's lawsuit: its price reveals a market-based estimate of litigation damages and its beta provides information regarding expected returns. The current estimate of damage across all 126 plaintiffs is $2.8 billion with a range from $0.3 to $10.1 billion depending on which of two quite divergent court decisions becomes precedent.
Introduction 1
During the early 1980s, regulators encouraged healthy savings and loan associations (S&Ls or thrifts) to acquire approximately 300 failing thrifts instead of closing them and paying off their insured depositors. These acquisitions, known as supervisory mergers, created an asset on the acquirers' balance sheets known as supervisory goodwill (SGW) which was equal to the difference between the fair market value of the acquired thrift's assets and liabilities under purchase accounting. According to the merger agreements, SGW could be amortized on a straight-line basis over periods of up to 40 years. Thrifts were willing to acquire failed institutions precisely because they could use SGW to meet minimum capital requirements rather than recognizing the negative net worth at the time of the merger. 2 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, however, restricted thrifts' abilities to use SGW as capital by reducing the amortization period and by creating alternative, stricter capital standards. As a result, many thrifts fell below minimum capital standards and were either closed by the regulators or forced to recapitalize. Today, 126 thrifts or individuals representing closed institutions, such as improved managerial incentives or reduced information asymmetry, do not apply.
Instead, the most likely explanation for the positive return is that the security's existence increased the probability CalFed would become an acquisition target by enabling potential acquirers to value CalFed's core assets independently from the highly uncertain litigation asset. Based on concurrent takeover premia for financial institutions, CalFed's change in market value corresponds to an 8.5% increase in takeover probability. I also test several other hypotheses including Blanchard et al's (1994) agency hypothesis that firms waste cash windfalls from lawsuits. Using a test that capitalizes on the unique relation between CalFed and the SGW security, I cannot reject the hypothesis that CalFed's stock returns reflect the full value of the potential damage award.
Besides illustrating the benefits of targeted stock as a way to facilitate acquisitions, this security reveals important information that was previously unavailable to the market: its price provide a market-based estimate of damages while its beta provides information regarding expected returns on the lawsuits. In section 4, I analyze the damage estimates prior to and following the Claims Court's decisions in the Glendale and CalFed cases.
Based on current prices, the market expects total damages across all 126 plaintiffs to be $2.8 billion with a range from $0.3 billion up to $10.1 billion, which is less the $20-$30 billion figure commonly cited in the popular press (see Schmitt, 1999, or Knigh and Biskupic, 1996) . The range around this point estimate is so large because the judges in the first two trials interpreted the cases so differently.
The security also reveals information regarding the market's expected returns. In section 5, I show how the levels and changes in CALGZ's beta correspond to important litigation events. Following the Supreme Court ruling, CALGZ's beta was 1.19 and significant which I interpret to mean the market was expecting the Claims Court would use an ex post damage theory (i.e. damages would be calculated using data subsequent to the breach). Once the market perceived that the Claims Court judge had accepted the plaintiff's lost profits arguments and made a rough determination of damages, the security began to trade like a fixed-rate bond with a beta of 0.34. Finally, after a second judge ruled against the use of lost profits in late 1998, the security dropped in value, its beta became indistinguishable from zero, and it began trading more like a lottery ticket with no systematic risk. I present qualitative evidence that is consistent, though not conclusive, with the econometric results.
Although this analysis focuses on a single, novel security, it yields a surprising amount information about the SGW lawsuits and, more generally, the use of targeted stock. These lawsuits have received relatively little attention in either the academic or popular press despite the fact they will likely establish important legal precedents regarding the determination of liability and the measurement of damages in regulatory cases. This paper highlights the existence of the lawsuits and the magnitude of the potential damages. In a broader context, this analysis provides a novel explanation for the use of targeted stock-it provides a way to resolve valuation discrepancies in acquisition settings. For potential targets, targeted stock can facilitate acquisition either by isolating hard-to-value assets or by generating independent, market-determined values; for potential acquirers, targeted stock highlights potentially undervalued segments and can serve as acquisition currency. In section 6, I summarize my findings and discuss some broader applications for litigation participation securities.
Section 2: Creation of CALGZ and CALGL
Historically, thrifts made money on the spread between what they earned on longterm, fixed-rate mortgages and what they paid on short-term deposits. But when the yield curve inverted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, hundreds of thrifts became insolvent and failed. Rather than closing these institutions and paying off their insured depositors, S&L regulators encouraged healthy thrifts to acquire them and book the shortfall between their assets and liabilities as supervisory goodwill. 4 CalFed, in particular, acquired six failing institutions between 1982 and 1983 resulting in $618 million of SGW.
Healthy thrifts agreed to acquire insolvent institutions for several reasons. Some viewed the negative spread between the market value of assets and liabilities as an entry fee. For example, both CalFed and Glendale acquired Florida S&Ls with the intention of using their deposits to fund California mortgages (McCue and Rosentstein, 1981) . These acquisitions circumvented prohibitions against interstate banking and permitted CalFed to raise "sticky", i.e. rate insensitive or core, deposits instead of more rate-sensitive brokered deposits. In other cases, the acquirers, including CalFed, were insolvent themselves on a mark-to-market basis. These acquisitions were interest-rate gambles against the government whereby the government was essentially offering free out-of-the-money call options. Thrifts willingly acquired knowing they had 40 years to get in-the-money (to amortize the goodwill). 5 Because most S&L liabilities were insured at the time, the regulators, not the creditors or depositors, set the option's maturity (see Merton, 1977 ).
Yet the regulators had agreed not to shut the acquiring thrifts for insufficient capital as part of the merger agreements. A final reason why thrifts did supervisory mergers was that they could take advantage of purchase accounting by accreting loan discounts (resulting from the write-down of assets) faster than they amortized goodwill. If the loans were repaid at par, they woul report positive income and increased net worth, which was especially important for low net worth thrifts (Black, 1990; and Slater, 1981 CalFed issued the first security to highlight the potential value of the litigation (CALGZ prospectus, p. 5):
The bank believes that the creation and distribution of the Participation Interests at this time will permit a desegregation of the imbedded value of the (California Federal) Bank's claim from the value of the Bank as a going concern. . . . the Bank seeks to create recognition of and value for the 75% of the Litigation recovery which it will retain.
An investment banker confirmed the confusion surrounding the value of damages (Prakash, 1997b, p. The distribution of the LTWs will provide a mechanism to allow the market to track the value of our pending goodwill lawsuit separately from the franchise value of the bank. The separation of the value of the underlying franchise from that of the goodwill lawsuit should allow both assets to be more accurately valued in the marketplace."
In addition to these securities, there is one other security whose value is solely tied to the outcome of the SGW lawsuits. Meritor Savings Bank, an S&L closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in December 1992, still trades despite having no assets other than its SGW lawsuit against the government. Previous research has shown that targeted stock announcements generate excess returns ranging from 2.1% to 3.4% (Logue et al, 1996; Zuta, 1997; and Billet and Mauer, 1998 (Willens, 1999) . First, the issuance is 9 The popular press often cites AmBase Corporation as another litigation security from a defunct S&L, but considered a distribution of property and, therefore, a taxable event. More importantly, if and when CalFed receives damages, shareholders will receive a cash distribution taxable upon receipt as ordinary income instead of a capital gain with taxes deferrable until sale.
Interestingly, Golden State, in an attempt to eliminate these tax disadvantages, issued litigation tracking warrants entitling the holders to common equity instead of cash. With regard to corporate taxes, CALGZ's issuance is immaterial because all damages flow through CalFed as a consolidated entity. Finally, an increase in the expected costs of financial distress resulting from an equity distribution would cause a negative return, ceteris paribus. Offsetting these costs would be an increase in equity option value, which is why the OTS prohibits distributions by undercapitalized thrifts and why this explanation is probably not the right one.
Logue et al (1996) assert that improved managerial incentives and greater asset transparency explain the positive returns associated with targeted stock. But the unique nature of these securities precludes these explanations. The proportional distribution of CALGZ shares to existing shareholders does not increase the likelihood that CalFed's lawyers and expert witnesses will work harder or litigate better. CalFed could easily have replicated the ultimate payoff by promising them a fraction of recovered damages without issuing the security if this were the objective. Moreover, CalFed as an institution has even less incentive to litigate post-issuance because it bears 100% of the costs, but receives only 74.6% of the benefits. With regard to asset transparency or, the issuance does not and will not reveal information about CalFed's lawsuit that is not already publicly known or will not be released independently of issuance. For example, the information from the Ambase has other operating assets and, therefore, is not a pure-play investment on the SGW lawsuits.
test cases would be released with or without the security. And unlike operating assets where interim cash flows are important signals, this asset does not generate interim cash flows. Thus neither explanation appears to work in this instance.
There are, however, two explanations based on agency conflicts that may explain the positive returns. The first explanation is that CALGZ represents a commitment to disburse cash. Jensen (1986) contends that managers often waste free cash flow, a contention that Blanchard et al (1994) corroborate with a sample of firms that received cash windfalls from lawsuits. 10 I test this hypothesis by capitalizing on the fact that CalFed and CALGZ are proportional claims on the same asset and, therefore, should exhibit proportional returns, particularly after controlling for the returns on CalFed's nongoodwill assets. CalFed (CAL) is comprised of two parts: its goodwill claim (SGW) and its S&L assets (S&L):
As a result, its returns should be a value-weighted average of returns on these two assets:
Where R CAL,t , R SGW,t , and R S&L,t are the returns on CalFed, the goodwill asset, and the S&L asset, respectively. Dividing through by CalFed's market value yields:
Equation 3 can be rewritten and tested econometrically as:
The next step is to calculate the weights (SGW/CAL and S&L/CAL) and the returns (R CAL , R SGW , and R S&L ). I must select proxies for SGW and S&L because neither one is observable. CALGZ's existence provides a way to estimate of the value of the goodwill asset. I assume that CalFed receives full credit (i.e. 74.62% of the total) for its share of the damage proceeds. I then assume that CalFed's S&L assets are equal to the difference between the value of the holding company and the value of the goodwill asset (S&L = CAL -SGW). For the rates, I can observe CalFed's returns (R CAL ) and CALGZ's returns (R SGW ). As a proxy for the S&L returns (R S&L ), I form a portfolio of the 10 largest California S&Ls that did not have goodwill lawsuits against the government and calculate the average return for the portfolio.
I run this regression during the period when both securities were trading (7/28/95 to 1/3/96) and test whether the coefficient on the goodwill variable (β 1 ) is equal to 1.00.
A coefficient that is significantly less than 1.00 would indicate that CalFed was not getting full credit for its share of the litigation asset. Such a finding would be consistent with value destruction at the corporate level. As shown in Table 2 , the coefficient on the goodwill asset is 0.634 for the 363 days when both securities were trading, which is significantly less than 1.00 at the 1% level. This coefficient may be negatively biased because of measurement error in the goodwill variable; measurement error in the S&L variable would also cause this coefficient to be biased though in an unknown direction.
To maximize the accuracy of the goodwill variable and minimize the measurement error in the S&L variable, I restrict the sample to days where the goodwill security had the largest absolute returns, i.e. days with major litigation-related news. 11 Table 2 shows samples where the absolute returns are greater than 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, and 10%. As the number of observations decreases, the informativeness of the observations increases and the adjusted R-squared increases from 22.2% to 47.8%. In three of the five regression (4%, 8%, and 10%), I cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the goodwill variable is equal to 1.00. Any remaining measurement error would only serve to push the coefficient closer to 1.00. Based on these findings, it appears that CalFed was receiving full credit for its share of the litigation proceeds. Contrary to Blanchard et al's (1994) results, preventing wasteful cash management does not seem to be the explanation for
CalFed's positive announcement day return.
A second agency-based hypothesis, however, does seem to explain the positive return. The presence of a goodwill lawsuit makes it difficult to value a potential target and, therefore, unlikely that merger partners will agree on a price. Risk averse managers, as potential acquirers, would be unwilling to pay the expected value of damages given the presence of a large, uncertain outcome- Green and Rydqvist (1997) show that investors demand a premium for bearing unsystematic risks in a study on Swedish lottery bonds.
Another reason why managers might not be willing to pay the expected value is that they fear ridicule given the trial's readily verifiable outcome: a manager who pays the ex ante expected value for what turns out to be worthless ex post may suffer embarrassment and condemnation. From a target's point of view, risk neutral shareholders would likely reject any offer for less than expected value. Risk averse target managers would also reject such an offer as long as they had higher subjective probabilities of winning-i.e. if they were more optimistic about the outcome than the potential acquirers. For these reasons, thrifts like CalFed with outstanding litigation claims were less likely to be acquisition targets or, for that matter, stock-based acquirers.
The available qualitative evidence supports the idea that SGW created a valuation problem for buyers and sellers. Banking analysts regularly pointed to the litigation as a stumbling block in acquisition negotiations (Mayer, 1997, p. 14):
The goodwill litigation could hold up the acquisition of those companies with large claims, specifically Glendale and Coast. It is unlikely that acquirers would want to pay for the potential value of the goodwill claim. Targeted stock helps resolve valuation discrepancies in one of two ways: it either isolates the hard-to-value assets and then allocates them to the party with the highest volume during this period. The trading volume is a lower bound because it is based on changes in quarterly holdings.
valuation, or it lets the market independently determine a price, as was the case with CalFed. Banking analysts noted this benefit (Prakash, 1997a; also Mayer, 1997, p. 14):
It (a litigation security) would definitely increase the attraction of a company like Coast to…separate the company's worth in takeover versus what it may get in a lawsuit…(because) nobody knows how to value the goodwill suits.
Another analyst, who initiated coverage following the CALGZ announcement, noted that CalFed was a "strong candidate for in-market consolidation" (Dusenbury, 1995) .
Consistent with these perspectives, two of the five litigation participation securities now in existence (CALGL and CCPRZ) were issued in conjunction with acquisitions. Similarly, almost one-third of the firms issuing targeted stock in Zuta's (1997) sample, issued the stock in conjunction with acquisitions. 13 Thus the issuance of targeted stock in advance of an acquisition could be a signal regarding acquisition probabilities.
To give a sense of how much CalFed's takeover probability would have to change to justify the $21.7 million increase in market value at announcement, I solve the following equation for the change in takeover probability (∆Prob):
∆Market value = ∆Prob(takeover)*(Takeover premium*CalFed's market value) (5) According to Mergerstat® Review, the average 5-day takeover premium for banking and finance mergers was 49.9% in 1995 (the prior 5-year average was 39.9%). CalFed's market value was $510 million prior to announcing CALGZ. Plugging these values in Equation 5 yields a change in takeover probability of 8.5% (the change using the 5-year average premium is 10.7%), which seems plausible given the analysts' comments and the eventual outcomes. Similar calculations for the rumored issuances by Coast Federal and Golden State yield changes in takeover probabilities of 9.0% and 24.9%, respectively.
There are two other possible, but less likely, explanations for CalFed's positive excess return. CalFed, by issuing CALGZ, created a quasi pure-play investment on the SGW lawsuits that might have appealed to a certain class of investors who, in an attempt to get an allocation of shares, bid up the price. increase for firms being added to the S&P 500 where demand from index investors is surely much greater than it was for CALGZ shares.
The second possible, but unlikely explanation for the positive return is that the announcement attracted enough analyst attention to reduce the cost of becoming informed about CalFed. According to Merton's (1977) model of costly information, an increase in the dissemination of information will increase a firm's investor base, reduce its cost of capital, and increase its market value. Using I/B/E/S data, I find that the number of analysts making full-year earnings estimates for CalFed increased by 50% (from eight to 12) from six months before to six months after the CALGZ announcement. Zuta (1997) documents an average 44% increase in the number of analysts following targeted stock issuance. 14 Over the same period, I find that mean (median) analyst recommendation on First Call improves from 2.86 to 2.00 (3.00 to 2.00) where 1.00 equals a strong buy and award where the exercise price is the payment due to First Nationwide plus issuance and litigation expenses.
CALGZ's existence enabled market analysts to calculate an unbiased, though not necessarily accurate, estimate of damages prior to the first major court decision in the Glendale case. Based on CALGZ's closing price of $11.625 on the day before the Glendale decision, its estimated damage award was $406 million (see Table 4 CalFed rulings. This number is significantly less than the $20-$30 billion number cited in the popular press for total damages (Schmitt, 1999; Knigh and Biskupic, 1996) , which seems to be derived from the maximum damage claims: Glendale was seeking $1.8 billion (324% of its $556 million in SGW) and CalFed was seeking $1.64 billion (338% of its $485.4 million in SGW). 17 Applying the average maximum damage claim to the estimated amount of industry SGW yields total claimed damages of $20.5 billion (= $6.2 billion * 331%).
The damage estimates can also be compared against actual awards. The Glendale security (GSBNZ) indicated an award of $983 million prior to the decision-the judge awarded Glendale $909 million for an 8.1% estimation error. In contrast, CALGZ indicated an award of $318 million, yet CalFed received only $23 million for a 92.8% estimation error. Rather than inefficient or biased pricing, these outcomes illustrate the divergence in judicial opinions-Glendale's damage award equaled 163.5% of its outstanding SGW while CalFed's equaled only 4.7%-and the market's surprise.
Subsequent to the Glendale and CalFed decisions, the prices of the litigation participation securities have dropped dramatically. Based on current prices and the average multiples across all litigation securities, the total damage estimate across all plaintiffs is now $2.8 billion (an average multiple of 45.8% times $6.2 billion of industry goodwill). There is, however, tremendous uncertainty associated with this number given the differences in the Glendale and CalFed rulings. If the Glendale ruling sets the precedent, then total damages could be as much as $10.1 billion (163.5% times $6.2 billion); if the CalFed ruling sets the precedent, then total damages could be as little as $290 million (4.7%*$6.2 billion). This difference in judicial opinion is relevant to the following analysis on the securities' expected returns.
Section 5: The information content of CALGZ's beta
The existence of a market price naturally raises the question of how investors are determining that price. To answer this question, I analyze CALGZ's beta and show how it reveals, in a CAPM world, the market's expected returns on the goodwill security. These returns should be related the magnitude of the damage award, which, in turn, is a function of the damage theory used to calculate damages. I also analyze changes in CALGZ's beta and show how they correspond to important court-related announcements regarding damages.
To understand this link between CALGZ's beta and the calculation of damages, it is necessary to understand what the award is and how its returns might co-vary with market returns. CALGZ is the present value of the damage award proceeds distributable to investors, where R CALGZ is the correct risk-adjusted discount rate and N is the number of years until receipt: The distributable amount equals the expected damage award less taxes, expenses, and capital retentions, which are a function of OTS regulations and CalFed's financial condition when it receives the award. All of the litigation participation securities pay cash, a zero beta asset, except for Golden State's litigation tracking warrants which exercisable for common shares, a relevant feature in subsequent analysis. I assume for the moment, though will test later, that CalFed is able to distribute the damage proceeds based on the fact that CalFed was well capitalized at the time of issuance (CALGZ prospectus, 1995, p. 22) . Given this assumption, the most likely source of covariance is the damage award amount. The other inputs are either stochastic (the time until receipt and expenses) or proportional to the award (taxes).
There are, in Posner's words (1986, p. 85) , "a bewildering variety" of remedies breach of contract cases, three of which the SGW plaintiffs have used in court (see GSBNZ proxy, 1998, pp. 15-16) . Reliance damages focus on the costs CalFed incurred while performing its part of the contract; restitution focuses on the benefits CalFed conferred on the government by acquiring the failed thrifts; and expectancy damages focus asset, are not well defined. Second, the comparative statics for at least two other parameters, volatility and maturity, are indeterminate (see Galai and Masulis, 1976 , Appendix 1).
on "the benefit of the bargain" or the benefits CalFed would have received but for the breach. 19 These remedies, or damage theories, can be calculated using either information known at the time of the breach (known as ex ante damages) or information known subsequent to the breach (known as ex post damages).
Prior to an actual court ruling, it was not clear which damage Court upheld government liability (7/1/96); the Claims Court ruled that thrifts can assert the "lost profits" damage theory (12/19/96); and the Claims Court rejected the lost profits damage theory (11/12/98). The first three events generated three of the four largest daily returns since issuance, excluding the volatile first week of trading. The results from a standard market model regression using the S&P 500 as the market appear in Table 5 . I include time dummy variables for each of the four events mentioned above and run F-tests to determine the significance of the sum of the coefficients on the S&P500 and time dummy variables in each period. Because the first event occurs only 24 days after issuance, a period with quite volatile returns, it is not significant and has been removed from the table. CALGZ's beta was not significant until the Supreme Court upholds liability, at which point it increased to 1.185 and became significant at the 10% level. This result holds when I replace the S&P 500 index with the NASDAQ index, calculate Scholes-Williams (1977) betas to account for non-synchronous, and employ a two-factor model with both market and bond returns as regressors (see Flannery and James, 1984) .
Given the magnitude of this result and it stability, I infer that the market was expecting the Claims Court would use an ex post damage theory, such as lost profits, following the Supreme Court's decision. Three pieces of evidence support this inference.
First, the test case plaintiffs have presented ex post lost profits calculations. In fact, both the government and the Court criticized the plaintiffs for using "speculative" ex post expectancy damages, which is the cost of replacing the SGW with alternative capital (Los Angeles Times, 11/25/98) analysis. 20 Second, following the Supreme Court decision, S&L analysts were making their own damage estimates using implicit, if not explicit, ex post lost profits calculations (see Dusenbury, 1996; Roberts, 1996; and Mayer, 1997) . Their analysis was based on the belief that the Court would use such an approach. Dusenbury (1996, p. 7) writes:
…we have come to the conclusion that a settlement will most likely equal lost returns from the period of August 1989 to time of payout… And third, the Claims Court Judge concurred with the plaintiff's damage assessment in a December 1996 ruling (Dusenbury, 1997, p. 3)-note this is the third event cited above:
It seems to me the more likely measure of damages though the Court can't say definitely until it hears the evidence, is lost profits.
These comments by the plaintiffs, S&L analysts, and the Judge are all consistent with the use of lost profits, in general, and ex post lost profits, in particular, as a damage theory.
Following the Judge's acceptance of lost profits as an admissible damage theory, CALGZ's beta fell to 0.339, which is significant at the 1% level. There are two possible explanations for the beta's decline: either the market changed its expectation from an ex post to an ex ante damage theory, or the market concluded that Judge Smith had settled on a damage theory and an approximate damage amount. The absence of published quotes indicating Judge Smith, the plaintiffs, or equity analysts expected anything other than ex post lost profits until November 1998 casts doubt on the first explanation. In contrast, there is direct evidence that Judge Smith not only accepted the lost profits argument, but also may have had a rough amount in mind. In mid 1997, after the plaintiffs concluded their testimony, Judge Smith declared (Yonan, 1997) :
Plaintiffs have put on an exceedingly strong and, I think, convincing case…In spite of the extensive cross-examination, I haven't seen any significant areas of credibility that have been challenged…If the decision were to be made today by me, which obviously it won't be, because I have heard only half the case, I would grant the plaintiffs recovery that they're seeking, essentially the same amounts they're seeking.
Given this statement, it seems that victory was likely and that an amount was foreseeable.
As a result, CALGZ began to trade more like a fixed-rate bond until the fourth event.
In contrast to Judge Smith, Judge Hodges ruled that lost profits was not an acceptable damage theory in the CalFed case, the fourth event. Since that time, CALGZ's beta has not been significantly different from zero. The judge's rejection of lost profits as a permissible damage theory injected a renewed uncertainty into the market. Lacking any indication of which damage theory might actually be used, investors began to trade CALGZ more like a lottery ticket with zero correlation with the market. In fact, investor uncertainty appears, after the fact, to be a reasonable interpretation given the widely divergent court rulings in the Glendale and CalFed cases. The judges in these two cases reached radically different conclusions and, accordingly, ordered radically different awards.
I verify these results in two ways. First, I test whether the betas for the other litigation securities exhibit similar levels and changes in response to the litigation events. Table 5 shows that they do except for Golden State (GSBNZ). Like CALGZ, Meritor (MTOR) trades for the entire period and has a beta of 0.879 following the Supreme Court decision. While the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level, it is significant at the 13% level and was even higher (1.208) and significant for the period leading up to the Supreme Court decision. It falls dramatically after the Court accepts lost profits-the coefficient falls to 0.551 and is highly significant-and becomes insignificant after the Court rejects the lost profits damage theory. CalFed's second security (CALGL) and Coast Financial's security (CCPRZ), though issued later, trade like fixed-rate bonds prior to the no lost profits ruling-with significant betas of 0.254 and 0.528, respectively-and become insignificant after the ruling. GSBNZ, however, presents somewhat of an anomaly. While the other securities were trading like fixed-rate bonds with betas ranging from 0.25 to 0.55, GSBNZ's beta was insignificant; and when the others betas became insignificant following the no lost profits ruling, GSBNZ's beta became significant and close to 1.00. What may explain this result is the fact that GSBNZ is a warrant payable in Golden State common shares-it was structured this way to eliminate the tax disadvantages described in section 2. In contrast, the other litigation securities are payable in cash, a zero-beta asset. I cannot reject the hypothesis that GSBNZ and Golden State have the same beta (results not shown).
I also verify these results by testing the most likely alternative hypothesis. Earlier, I assumed that CalFed would be able to distribute the damage proceeds so that I could ignore the expected capital retention. It is possible that CALGZ's beta reflects CalFed's ability to distribute the damage proceeds. According to this hypothesis, general economic improvements would cause the market to rise, CalFed's financial health to improve, the probability of needing to retain capital to decrease, the distributable amount to increase, and CALGZ's value to increase. As a result, CALGZ would have a positive beta and one that declines as CalFed's financial condition improved.
I reject this alternative hypothesis on several grounds. First, Meritor (MTOR), a defunct S&L with no restrictions on its ability to distribute damage proceeds, exhibits roughly the same time-series pattern as CALGZ does. Second, CalFed exceeded the minimum capital requirements governing distributions from the date it issued CALGZ in 1995. 21 Moreover, its financial condition and capitalization only improved over time casting some doubt on the hypothesis that small improvement in financial health could explain the large declines in its beta. Table 6 shows five different measures of financial health including CalFed's net worth ratio at book value, net worth ratio at market value, Sheshunoff bank rating, Moody's preferred stock rating, and deposit rate spread as a proxy for credit risk (CalFed's 5-year CD rate versus the Los Angeles average). The first three measures improve over time, the Sheshunoff rating goes up then down though California Federal ends up as a median performer, and the rate spread shows no definite pattern. Finally, I reran the regressions in Table 5 , but with two time dummy variables corresponding to the dates when Moody's upgraded CalFed's preferred stock. Neither coefficient was significant. Similar analysis on ratings changes for the other institutions yields similar results. Thus, I conclude changes in financial condition, as proxies for the probability of being able to distribute proceeds, do not explain CALGZ's large, positive beta following the Supreme Court ruling or and the subsequent declines following the acceptance and then rejection of lost profits as a damage theory.
Section 5: Conclusion
21 There was a brief period in early 1997 following the acquisition by First Nationwide where there was a possibility that CalFed would no longer be classified as "well-capitalized." CalFed management expected this situation to be rectified quickly and it was (CALGL prospectus, 1996, p. 13) CalFed's creation and issuance of litigation participation securities provides an opportunity to analyze a unique form of targeted stock with wide ranging applications.
Consistent with previous studies of targeted stock, CalFed experienced a positive excess return when it announced CALGZ. In contrast to the information-based explanations commonly used to justify the use of targeted stock, I attribute CalFed's positive return to an increased probability of takeover even though I cannot rule out the possibility that it was caused by several factors acting in unison. Besides providing a mechanism to resolve valuation discrepancies, these securities yield important information to litigants and investors. CALGZ's price has and will continue to reveal an unbiased estimate of damages. According to current security prices, total damages are now on the order of $2.8 billion, which represents an expensive epilogue to what has already been an expensive period in S&L history. At the same time, CALGZ's beta provides some insight into how the market is estimating damages. Neither the damage estimates nor the inferences regarding possible damage theories would have been possible without these securities.
In terms of applications, the use of targeted stock in mergers and acquisitions is a novel concept. By isolating hard-to-value assets, particularly assets with unhedgeable risks such as deregulation or litigation, targeted stock allows buyers and sellers to focus on core assets and increases the probability they will agree on price. In fact, Corporate
Finance magazine (1996) recently named a transaction using targeted stock as its "M&A Deal of the Year" for exactly this reason. This ability to facilitate agreements between buyers and sellers could significantly expand the realm of possible deals in the coming years. In fact, more targeted stock issues have been announced in 1999 than in any previous year, and many of these are being done to facilitate acquisitions. What is different about the recent issues, however, is that firms like DLJ, Liberty Media, and DuPont are issuing targeted stock as potential acquirers rather than as potential targets.
Additional research is needed on both the acquisition and information uses of targeted stock. For multi-segment firms, particularly those with internet businesses seeking to capitalize on the booming market for internet stock, understanding how and why targeted stock creates value is critical.
Within the legal profession, these lawsuits in general and these securities in particular have important ramifications. The lawsuits will establish important legal precedents regarding the determination of liability and the measurement of damages.
Similar issues are present in other major lawsuits against the government such as utilities suing to recover stranded asset investments and contractors suing to recover on "expiring use" housing. With regard to the securities, targeted stock can be used to fund litigation or restructure litigation compensation. For example, cash-strapped plaintiffs could use litigation securities to pay for legal expenses or to improve litigant's incentives. Litigation securities could also be used to evaluate lawyers or expert witnesses by studying the returns on days when they are announced or testify. These are just a few of the many possible applications for targeted stock outside the traditional, and relatively restricted applications in the field of corporate finance. News, 1997) . I use a one-day event window for CalFed and two-day event window (-1,0) for the rumors because of event date uncertainty. I estimate the market model over 250 days ending on event day -21 using total returns on the S&P500 as the market, and test for significance using Mikkelson and Ruback's (1991) approach. Abnormal changes in market value are equal to the abnormal return on day t times the market value on day t-1. This table analyzes CalFed's returns (R CAL ) as a weighted average of returns on the goodwill security (R SGW = R CALGZ ) and a portfolio of California S&L thrifts (R S&L ) during the period 7/28/95 to 1/3/96 when both CalFed (CAL) and the goodwill security (CALGZ) were trading. The weights assume CalFed is comprised of S&L assets (S&L) and a goodwill claim (SGW) and are determined as of the prior day of trading: CAL is CalFed's market value of equity, SGW is the theoretical value of CalFed's goodwill claim assuming the market gives it credit for the full award; and S&L is the difference between CAL and SGW (S&L t-1 = CAL t-1 -SGW t-1 ). S&L returns are based on a portfolio of the 10 largest California S&Ls that did not have goodwill claims against the government. The sample includes all days on which both CalFed and CALGZ were trading, and five subsamples based on the absolute value of CALGZ's returns. The tested hypothesis is that both β 1 and β 2 are equal to 1.0. 
Event

Derivation
Figure 1 Damage Award as a Function of Market Prices
The prices per share of the litigation participation securities provide a market-based estimate of CalFed's damage award. The CALGL prospectus (1996, pp. 45-46) describes the methodology for calculating the value allocated to the participation securities and provides parameter values for some of the variables. 
Expected
